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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Joshua Thomas Bennett appeals from the judgment of conviction for delivery of a 
controlled substance (marijuana) following a jury trial. On appeal, he asserts that the 
district court erred, and violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser, 
when it sustained the State's relevance objection during his attempt to cross-examine 
the State's key witness regarding a matter testified to on direct examination and that 
concerned the witness' bias, interest, or motive. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Following a jury trial at which the chief witness against him was Levi Sermon, a 
confidential informant, Mr. Bennett was found guilty of delivery of a controlled substance 
(marijuana). (See generally Trs.) During defense counsel's cross-examination of 
Mr. Sermon, he attempted to ask Mr. Sermon about his prior activities as a cocaine 
dealer, but the district court sustained the State's relevancy objection. (Tr. (Vol. 11), 
p.13, L.17 - p.15, L.17.) This was despite the fact that, on direct examination, 
Mr. Sermon had testified regarding his past as a cocaine dealer, and claimed that 
making amends for his past work as a drug dealer was the main reason why he began 
working as an informant. (Tr. (Vol. I), p.222, Ls.10-16.) 
Mr. Bennett received a unified sentence of five years, with two-and-one-half 
years fixed (R., pp.131-32), and filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., p.140.) 
1 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err, and violate Mr. Bennett's Sixth Amendment right to confront his 
accuser, when it sustained the State's relevance objection during his attempt to cross-
examine the confidential informant regarding matters testified to on direct examination 
and that concerned his bias, interest, or motive? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred, And Violated Mr. Bennett's Sixth Amendment Right To 
Confront His Accuser, When It Sustained The State's Relevance Objection During His 
Attempt To Cross-Examine The Confidential Informant Regarding Matters Testified To 
On Direct Examination And That Concerned His Bias, Interest. Or Motive 
A. Introduction 
At trial, after establishing that confidential informant Levi Sermon was being paid 
$200 to $300 for each controlled buy he completed for police (Tr. (Vol. II), p.13, Ls.4-
16), 1 defense counsel attempted to cross-examine him regarding his past as a drug 
dealer, as follows: 
Q. How many times did you sell cocaine? 
[Prosecutor:] Your Honor, I'm going to object. That's not relevant to this 
particular inquiry. 
[Defense counsel:] I believe it is, Your Honor. They raised it yesterday 
his past, his drug dealing. I think we're entitled to go into it because it 
affects his credibility. 
[Prosecutor:] His prior conduct years ago does not affect his credibility on 
the issues of this date. The number of times he may have engaged in a 
felony itself does not affect his credibility on this date. 
[Defense counsel:] We've talked about it already. She brought it up 
yesterday, and I'm following up today. And he - without any objection, he 
started - he talked about selling cocaine. That was what his prior felony 
was. So I'm asking him how many times he did it. 
THE COURT: I don't know how long ago we're talking about. 
Because it may not be relevant at this point. 
[Defense counsel:] All right. I guess I could ... 
THE COURT: I mean, was it more recent than - I think you need to 
lay some kind of foundation. 
[Defense counsel:] Okay. Thank you. 
1 He had previously worked as an informant to avoid a conviction for selling cocaine. 
(Tr. (Vol. II), p.11, L.11 -p.12, L.2.) 
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Q. After your bust for cocaine delivery, did you after that 
point? 
A. No. 
Q. But you did before that point? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. How long before that point? 
THE COURT: Okay. I don't know when he was busted for 
Q. When were you busted for cocaine sales? 
A. I believe it was 2009. 
Q. Okay. 
[Prosecutor:] Your Honor, I'm going to object to any further inquiry. He 
hasn't been convicted of that. I allowed some of it because I felt it was 
relevant to the cooperation agreement and why he was working in the first 
place. But going into specific instances is completely inappropriate, and 
it's not a conviction. So I'm going to object to any further inquiry into this. 
[Defense counsel:] Your Honor -
THE COURT: It was four years ago. 
[Defense counsel:] Yes. But we're establishing what this gentleman's 
knowledge of his drug trade is. He's the one that mentioned it yesterday. 
THE COURT: 
sufficiently. 
I'll sustain the objection. I think it's been argued 
[Defense counsel:] Okay. 
(Tr. (Vol. II), p.13, L.17 - p.15, L.17 (emphases added).) 
During the State's direct examination of Mr. Sermon, it had inquired as to why he 
"start[ed] working [as an informant] for the sheriff's office in the first place," to which he 
responded, 
I used to be a drug dealer. All I could think about every night was how 
many kids' lives I'd ruined, how many mamas' babies is out doing drugs 
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of me. I feel like I'm giving back and doing something that's right. 
No mom or parent should have to see that. 
(Tr. (Vol. I), p.222, 10-16.) 
Because I.R. 611 (b) provides that "[c]ross-examination should be limited to the 
subject matter of direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness," 
and because the answer sought was relevant to the confidential informant's motivation 
to testify, the district court abused its discretion when it sustained the State's relevance 
objection to his attempt to cross-examine the confidential informant regarding matters 
he testified to on direct examination, namely his motivation for acting as an informant.2 
Additionally, the district court's decision to sustain the State's objection deprived 
Mr. Bennett of his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. 
B. The District Court Erred, And Violated Mr. Bennett's Sixth Amendment Right To 
Confront His Accuser, When It Sustained The State's Relevance Objection 
During Mr. Bennett's Attempt To Cross-Examine The Confidential Informant 
Regarding Matters Testified To On Direct Examination And That Concerned His 
Bias, Interest, Or Motive 
1. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sustained The State's 
Relevance Objection 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
I.RE. 401. The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained, "The credibility of a witness is 
always material." State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 38 (Ct. App. 1988). Quoting the United 
2 Because this issue is non-constitutional, Mr. Bennett will discuss it first. See State v. 
Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 6 (2010) (W. Jones, J., concurring) ("It is a fundamental principle of 
our jurisprudence that courts pass on deciding constitutional issues if the case can be 
decided without addressing the constitutional question.") (citations omitted). 
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Supreme of the similar federal rule of evidence, the Court 
that that bears on credibility is relevant, and that 
"'[b]ias may be induced by a witness' .. self-interest.' Generally, 'Proof of bias is 
almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has 
historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and 
truth of a witness' testimony."' State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 540 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984 )) (citations omitted). 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 611 (b ), in relevant part, provides, "Cross-examination 
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting 
the credibility of the witness." I.R.E. 611 (b). The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained, 
"The appropriate scope of cross-examination includes not only the facts testified to on 
direct examination, but other facts connected with those facts, directly or indirectly, 
tending to explain, modify, or qualify the inferences resulting from the direct 
examination." State v. Brummett, 150 Idaho 339, 344 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. 
Starry, 96 Idaho 148, 150 (1974)). 
Defense counsel was attempting to cross-examine Mr. Sermon about a matter he 
testified to on direct examination - his motivation for acting as an informant - and about 
a matter that went directly to his bias, interest, and motive in acting as a confidential 
informant and testifying for the State. Both bases for the subject on which defense 
counsel sought to cross-examine Mr. Sermon were appropriate areas of inquiry under 
I.R.E. 401 and 611 (b ). As such, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to 
recognize both the relevance of the questioning and the fact that it was an area to which 
cross-examination "should be limited" under I.R.E. 611 (b). In light of the crucial nature 
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of Sermon's testimony, the district court's 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
of discretion cannot be said to have 
2. Mr. Bennett's Sixth Amendment Right To Confront His Accuser Was 
Violated When The District Court Sustained The State's Relevance 
Objection 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part, 
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
The United States Supreme Court has explained the significance of the Sixth 
Amendment right to cross-examine the government's witnesses as follows: 
Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a 
witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject always to the 
broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly 
harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve 
into the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but the 
cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, 
the witness. . . . A more particular attack on the witness' credibility is 
effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing 
possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may 
relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The partiality 
of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is "always relevant as 
discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony." We 
have recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is 
a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of 
cross-examination. 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). The Idaho Supreme Court has explained, 'This court has consistently held that 
where a defendant is seeking on cross-examination to show bias or test the credibility of 
the complaining witness, the trial court should allow considerable latitude." State v. 
White, 97 Idaho 708, 713 (1976) (citing State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 375-76 (1962)). 
Mr. Bennett's thwarted attempt to cross-examine Mr. Sermon regarding his 
testimony on direct examination, which also concerned his bias, interest, or motive in 
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acting as a informant testifying 
Amendment right to confront his accuser. In 
Mr. Bennett violated his Sixth 
Mr. Bennett from cross-
examining on the issue, the district cou1i failed to recognize what the United States 
Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have recognized: that the trial court 
should give "considerable latitude" to defense counsel and that "exposure of a witness' 
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally 
protected right of cross-examination." In light of the crucial nature of Mr. Sermon's 
testimony, the violation of Mr. Bennett's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation cannot 
be said to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Bennett respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a new 
trial at which he is allowed to conduct adequate cross-examination of the State's chief 
witness against him. 
DATED this 14th day of August, 2014. 
\ 
SF(ENC¥R J. HAHN 
Depl:liyrState Appellate Public Defender 
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